Abstract:
In this study, we examine whether customers use environmental covenants in supply contracts to manage potential legal liabilities arising from suppliers’ environmental activities. We focus on customer asset placement (CAP), an operational arrangement in which customers place assets at suppliers’ facilities and may thereby face heightened environmental liability exposure. Using a large language model to analyze 6,390 SEC-filed supply contracts from 1995 to 2022, we find environmental covenants in 42.8% of CAP contracts, compared with 13.9% of non-CAP contracts. Consistent with a liability mechanism, the CAP-covenant association increases with the extent of asset placement and with enforcement and litigation exposure. Exploiting the staggered state adoption of the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act, we also document a stronger post-adoption covenant response among CAP contracts. Environmental covenants in CAP relationships are associated with a lower likelihood of subsequent supplier environmental violations and, where public enforcement is stronger, lower toxic emissions. The findings highlight legal liability spillover from suppliers to customers as a motivation for environmental contracting and suggest that private contractual governance can complement public enforcement.
Contact Emails:
zlynne@ceibs.edu